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Abstract 
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coexisting with extremely vulnerable economies. They also show that the LA region as a whole is 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that macroeconomic volatility generates both economic and political uncertainty 
with detrimental effects on investment and consumption plans and, ultimately, future economic 
growth (Acemoglu et al., 2003) and aggregate welfare (Athanasoulis and van Wincop, 2000). There 
is therefore considerable interest, among academics as well as policy-makers, in shedding light on 
the sources of output fluctuations, especially in the new economic environment characterised by a 
much greater role played by emerging market economies. Stronger international financial and trade 
linkages have affected the relative importance of external, regional and country-specific factors in 
driving national business cycles, with implications for the design of effective stabilisation policies 
(Fatàs and Mihov, 2006). Economic theory does not provide unequivocal predictions: stronger 
linkages could result either in a higher or a lower degree of business cycle co-movement depending 
on whether or not demand- and supply-side (as well as wealth) effects dominate over increased 
specialisation of production through the reallocation of capital (Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005; Imbs, 
2006; Kose et al. 2003, 2012). This cannot be established ex-ante: it is essentially an empirical 
question.  
A knowledge of cross-country spillover effects is especially relevant for emerging countries 
because of their higher degree of volatility compared to more mature economies. According to 
Loayaza et al. (2007), both internal and external factors explain why emerging economies are so 
volatile: i) the instrinsic instability induced by the development process itself; ii) the lack of 
effective mechanisms (such as well functioning financial markets and proper stabilisation 
macroeconomic policies) to absorb external fluctuations; iii) the exposure to exogenous shocks in 
the form of sudden capital inflows/outflows and/or large changes in the international terms of trade. 
The Latin American (LA) economies in particular have experienced a remarkable sequence 
of booms and busts in the last three decades. After the debt crisis of the 1980s, most countries in the 
region benefited from huge capital inflows (with a resulting high growth rate) until the Russian 
crisis in the late nineties led to their sudden drying up; then in the early years of the following 
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decade higher liquidity, a dramatic rise in commodity prices and low risk premia created a 
particularly favourable macroeconomic and financial environment in the region and generated again 
robust growth (Österholm and Zettelmeyer, 2007; Izquierdo et al., 2008); therefore the question has 
been asked whether there has been a decoupling of the business cycle in the industrialised countries 
and the LA region respectively, the latter having become an increasingly autonoumos source of 
growth for the world economy. 
Most of the existing literature on international business cycles focuses on the industrial 
countries, specifically the Group of Seven (Bagliano and Morana, 2010), Europe (Artis et al., 2004), 
East Asia and North America (Helbling et. al, 2007), Western Europe and North America (Mody et 
al., 2007). There are, however, a few studies on LA differing in the set of countries examined and 
the adopted econometric methodology, and providing mixed evidence. Focusing on the average 
behaviour of the aggregate LA region, Izquierdo et al. (2008) find that external shocks account for a 
significant share of the variance of regional GDP growth. Similar results are reported by Österholm 
and Zettelmeyer (2007) for both the LA region as a whole and its individual countries, whilst Aiolfi 
et al. (2010) identify a sizeable common component in the LA countries’ business cycles, 
suggesting the existence of a regional cycle. By contrast, Hoffmaister and Roldos (1997) conclude 
that domestic country-specific aggregate supply shocks are by far the most important source of 
output fluctuations in the LA countries. Kose et al. (2003) find that country-specific factors explain 
the largest share of the variance of output in these countries, with the exception of Bolivia, where 
the world component is more important than the regional and country-specific ones. Finally, Boschi 
and Girardi (2011) report that domestic factors account for by far the largest share of domestic 
output variability in six major LA countries, and that regional factors are more important than 
international ones. 
None of the aforementioned papers includes the great recession of 2008 and 2009. By 
contrast, the present study examines the last three decades to assess the relative role of country-
specific, regional and external shocks in explaining business cycle fluctuations in six major LA 
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economies (namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) and the LA region as a 
whole, with the aim of shedding light on the role of bilateral trade flows and financial linkages in 
business cycle co-movements between the LA region and its main economic partners. 
Building on the work of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), we specify a very flexible empirical 
model enabling us to analyse the propagation of international business cycles without any 
restrictions on the directions of short- and long-run spillovers or the nature of the propagation 
mechanism itself. Using quarterly data from 1980:I to 2011:IV, we document a high degree of 
heterogeneity among the LA countries: while Argentina, Mexico and Peru appear to be increasingly 
dependent on external developments as a result of the great recession, Venezuela seems to be 
influenced mainly by the LA regional business cycle, with only Brazil showing a decreasing role of 
the external factors. As for the LA region as a whole, our results indicate that it can be characterised 
as a small open economy largely dependent on external developments. This applies especially to the 
the years following the great recession of 2008 and 2009, contradicting the so-called decoupling 
hypothesis. 
In particular, our findings imply that the goods trade channel is the most important source of 
these linkages. Capital flows also affect business cycle co-movements, but their role is limited, 
especially in the very short run. The disaggregate analysis focusing on their components (debt, 
portfolio equity and foreign direct investment flows) reveals a negative effect of portfolio equity 
flows on the degree of business cycle synchronisation, as predicted by standard international real 
business cycle models with complete markets. By contrast, short-term capital and foreign direct 
investment flows reinforce in the short run the role of the trade channel and make the LA region 
more vulnerable to shocks from abroad, consistently with recent empirical evidence (e.g., Imbs, 
2006, 2010).   
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used to assess the 
propagation mechanism of international business cycles. Section 3 describes the data and presents 
the empirical results based on the forecast error variance decompositions for the individual LA 
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countries and the LA region as a whole. Section 4 provides evidence on the role of financial and 
trade linkages. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Methodology 
2.1. The Empirical Framework 
We focus on output growth in order to analyse the dynamic relationships between the LA region 
and the rest of the world as well as the intra-area linkages among countries belonging to that region. 
Given the increasing degree of integration of the global economy, it is essential to consider possible 
linkages with a number of foreign economies. It is equally important to allow for time variation, 
since a fixed parameter model is not likely to capture possibly important changes in the business 
cycle propagation mechanisms resulting from globalisation.1 
Consequently, the modelling approach chosen here differs from previous ones in two ways. 
First, it is flexible enough to accommodate possible nonlinear shifts in the propagation of 
international business cycles; second, it is based on analysing linkages with the output growth rate 
of various economies outside the LA region rather than a number of macroeconomic variables for a 
single foreign country (typically the US). Therefore we include the US as the main driving force 
behind business cycles co-movements in the LA region (see the literature on the US “backyard”, 
e.g. Ahmed, 2003; Canova, 2005; Caporale et al., 2011), but also the Euro area because of its 
historical trade linkages with the LA region, as well as Japan (given the financial linkages 
documented by Boschi, 2012, and Boschi and Girardi, 2011) and China, whose trade linkages with 
the LA region have become much stronger in recent years (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2011). 
                                                 
1 Including additional variables (such as interest rates, exchange rates, consumption or investment) for a wide range of 
countries would result in a system whose dimensions would not be manageable in the standard Vector AutoRegression 
(VAR) approach followed here. Even advanced econometric approaches, such as the Global VAR (see Cesa-Bianchi et 
al., 2011, and Boschi and Girardi, 2011) or dynamic factor models (as in Kose et al. 2012, among others), would not be 
a fully satisfactory modelling strategy since they belong to the class of (linear) time-invariant models.  
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As in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), the econometric framework is based on the following 
covariance-stationary Vector AutoRegression (VAR) model 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
pk k k k
t j t j tj
y y u            (1) 
in its moving average representation  
( ) ( ) ( )
0
k k k
t j t jj
y u             (2) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )
1
pk k k
i i i jj     , p  is the order of autoregression, the vector y  includes the n  
endogenous variables of the system, 1,...,t T  indexes time, and e  is the vector of residuals, with 
( )[ ]ktE u  0 , ( ) ( ) ( )[ , ]k k kt s uE u u    if s t  and ( ) ( )[ , ]k kt sE u u  0  otherwise. All elements refer to the 
generic k -th estimation sample with window size of T   observations, so that if T   then 
1k  , whilst if T  , model (1) involves 1k T   different rolling estimates, where the sample 
initially spans the period from the first available observation to  , and then both its starting and 
ending period are shifted forward by one datapoint at a time. As pointed out by Granger (2008), 
linear models with time-varying parameters are actually very general nonlinear models, and 
therefore the chosen framework is ideally suited to analysing the issues of interest. 
2.2. Innovation Accounting 
Examining all the effects of the lagged variables in a VAR model is often both difficult and 
unnecessary for the purposes of the analysis (Sims, 1980). Rather, it is more convenient to resort to 
some transformations of the estimated model (1) in order to summarise the dynamic linkages among 
the n  variables under investigation. In the business cycle literature, a useful metric often used to 
measure the extent of business cycle synchronisation is the sum of the variance shares of different 
classes of shocks such as country-specific, regional or global sources of economic fluctuations (see 
Kose et al, 2012, among others).2 
                                                 
2 Note that the methodology used in Kose et al. (2012) differs from ours in that they compute the variance 
decomposition of the raw series of interest, while in the present paper the forecast error variance decomposition is 
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Since the reduced-form residuals u ’s are generally correlated, a common practice to obtain 
uncorrelated shocks is to use the Choleski decomposition of ( )ku . Despite its straightforward 
implementation, this method has the drawback that it is sensitive to the ordering of the variables in 
the system, and therefore all possible permutations should be considered when carrying out the 
dynamic simulations for a thorough assessment. A popular alternative is provided by the 
Generalised Forecast Error Variance (GFEV) decomposition (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). This 
approach estimates the percentage of the variance of the h -step ahead forecast error of the variable 
of interest which is explained by conditioning on the non-orthogonalised shocks while explicitly 
allowing for contemporaneous correlations between these shocks and those to the other equations in 
the system 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2
, , ( ) 0
,
1 ( )hk k kl m h l q u mk q
m m
GFEV e e            (3) 
where the selection vectors le  and me  have their l -th and m -th entries equal to one, respectively, 
with all other elements being zero, and ( ),
k
m m  stands for the standard deviation associated to the m -
th equation of the system. 
Although the GFEV method does not allow a structural interpretation of the impulses, it 
overcomes the identification problem by providing a meaningful characterisation of the dynamic 
responses of the variables of interest to observable shocks. A further useful feature of this approach 
is its invariance to the ordering of the variables. Note, however, that owing to the possible non-
diagonal form of matrix ( )ku , the sum over m  of the elements (3) need not be unity in the original 
formulation provided by Pesaran and Shin (1998). In order to be able to interpret the results, we 
                                                                                                                                                                  
carried out. Therefore, while we analyse the innovation (or unsystematic) part of the series represented by the residual 
of the estimated model, they decompose its systematic part. The limitation of their approach, namely a Bayesian 
dynamic latent factor model, is that it does not allow the identification of the geographical origin of the factors affecting 
domestic business cycles, but rather of the world, region and country-specific components of a series. 
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follow Wang (2002) and rescale (3) using the total variance in the generalised rather than in the 
orthogonal case  
( ) ( ) 2
( ) 0
,( )
, ,
( ) ( ) 2
( )1 0
,
1 ( )
1 ( )
h k k
l q u mk q
m mk
l m h n h k k
l q u mkm q
m m
e e
e e

 
  
 

         (4) 
so that ( ), ,1 1
n k
l m hm    (for all k  and h ), that is the sum of the variance decompositions in (4) are 
normalised to unity. 
2.3. Measuring Spillover Effects at Country and Regional Level 
By computing the decomposition (4) for all variables in system (1) for a given recursion k  and for a 
given simulation horizon h , we obtain the following n n  matrix (the spillover table according to 
the terminology of Diebold and Yilmaz 2012),3 which makes it possible to measure to extent to 
which two or more variables of the system are connected to each other: 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1,1, 1,2, 1, , 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2,1, 2,2, 2, , 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
,1, ,2, , , , 1, , 2,
... ...
... ...
...
k k k k k k
h h n h n h n h n h
k k k k k k
h h n h n h n h n h
k k k k
n h n h n n h n n h n n h
 
 
 
     
     
    
       
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
) ( )
, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1,1, 1,2, 1, , 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2,1, 2,2, 2, , 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, ,
(
,1,
...
... ...
... ...
k k
n n h
k k k k k k
n h n h n n h n n h n n h n n h
k k k k k k
n h n h n n h n n h n n h n n h
n h
       
       

     
     

       
1 1 1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,2, , , , 1, , 2, , ,... ...
k k k k k k
n h n n h n n h n n h n n h 
                  
   (5) 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) show that a synthetic measure of the spillovers received by 
(transmitted to) country l  from (to) all other countries can be obtained by summing by columns 
(rows) all the off-diagonal elements in the l -th row (column). We adapt their framework by 
dividing the variable of system (1) into two distinct subsets (which we label regional and external 
groups) with dimension of 1 6n   and 1 4n n  , respectively. 
We compute country-specific, ( ),
k
cs h , regional, ( ),krs h , and external shocks, ( ),kes h , as 
                                                 
3 By construction, the elements in each row of (5) sum up to unity, so that the total variance of the system is equal to n . 
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( ) ( )
, , ,
k k
cs h l l h              (6) 
1( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , ,1
nk k k
rs h l m h l l hm              (7) 
1
( ) ( )
, , ,1
nk k
es h l m hm n              (8) 
for all 11,...,l n . 
Moving from a single country to a regional perspective, we define the region-specific 
shocks, ( ) ,
k
reg h , as 
1 1( ) ( )
, , ,1 1
1
1 n nk k
reg h l m hl mn  
             (9) 
whilst the aggregate external shocks (that is, the innovations originating outside the LA region) are 
computed as 
1
1
( ) ( )
, , ,1
1
1 n nk k
ext h l m hl m nn  
             (10) 
i.e., both (6) and (7) are normalised so as to lie in the [0, 1] interval. 
In order to identify the direction of the linkages between the two (aggregate) blocs of 
countries we define the regional net spillover index, ( ),
k
net h , as the difference between the variability 
transmitted to and received by the elements belonging to the external bloc of the system 
1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , ,1 1 1 1
n n n nk k k
net h l m h l m hl n m l m n                   (11) 
so that positive (negative) values for (11) indicate that the region is a net transmitter (receiver) of 
variability to (from) outside. Using condition (11), it is straightforward to obtain a breakdown for 
the individual countries forming the external bloc, so that we can define 1n n  pairwise regional net 
spillover indexes, ( ),
k
cty h , as 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , ,1 1
n nk k k
cty h cty m h cty m hm l               (12) 
where 1 1,...,cty n n  . 
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Before discussing the empirical findings it is worth noting that both the  ’s and  ’s indices 
depend on the simulation span (through the index h ) and on the estimation sample (through the 
index k ). This is motivated by the need for a sufficiently flexible model specification to analyse the 
sources of business cycles in a period such as the recent one characterised by exceptionally large 
fluctuations.4 Further, considering a wide range of simulation horizons enables us to obtain a 
dynamic picture of how cross-country business cycle linkages evolve when moving from the short 
to the long run through a sequence of GFEV decompositions for which the conditioning 
information is becoming progressively less important as the simulation horizon widens.5 
 
3. Assessing Business Cycle Co-movements in the LA Bloc: Country-specific and Regional 
Evidence 
3.1. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
We use quarterly real GDP series for six major LA countries (namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) and for the four largest economies in the world (the US, the Euro 
area, Japan and China) over the period 1980:I-2011:IV.6 The ten chosen economies represent about 
75 percent of real world GDP, with the six LA countries included representing approximately 85 
                                                 
4 Note that since the GFEVs are transformations of model parameters, allowing for time variation in the parameters of 
the underlying empirical model translates into time-varying nonlinear dynamic interactions among the elements in y  in 
(1). 
5 Note that Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) focus on a selected forecast horizon rather than a continuum of simulation steps. 
Obtaining full information from the entire simulation horizon is therefore novel in this context. 
6 The GDP series are taken from Datastream and seasonally adjusted by using the X-12 method, as suggested by Cesa-
Bianchi et al. (2011). Their codes are: AGXGDPR.C (Argentina), BRXGDPR.C (Brazil), CLI99BVPH (Chile), 
MXI99BVRG (Mexico), PEI99BVPH (Peru), VEXGDPR.C (Venezuela), USXGDPR.D (US), EKXGDPR.D (euro 
area), JPXGDPR.D (Japan), CHXGDPR.C (China). Other economies of the LA region (such as Colombia or Bolivia) 
are not included in the analysis because of the lack of data on GDP for the eighties. The same choice was made by 
Boschi and Girardi (2011) and Caporale et al. (2011), among others. 
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percent of real GDP in the LA region over the period 1980-2010 according to the World 
Development Indicator data. 
As a preliminary step, we test for the presence of unit roots in the GDP series in logarithms. 
ADF tests are performed, both on the levels and the first differences of the series. In each case, we 
are unable to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels at conventional significance 
levels. On the other hand, differencing the series appears to induce stationarity. Standard 
stationarity tests corroborate this conclusion.7 
Given the nonstationarity of the time series and the lack of an economic theory suggesting 
the number of long-run relationships and/or how they should be interpreted, it is reasonable not to 
impose the restriction of cointegration on a VAR model (Ramaswamy and Sloek, 1998). Thus, we 
have opted for a specification in first differences since the focus of our analysis is on (time-varying) 
short-run linkages rather than secular trends (as, for instance, in Bernard and Durlauf, 1995).  
More specifically, we choose size 80 for the rolling windows (i.e., 20 years of quarterly 
observations, 80 observations in all). This can be regarded as a compromise between stability and 
flexibility, as it turned out that a smaller window size makes the VAR models more unstable.8 Such 
a choice implies that the complete set of recursions produces 48 different sets of VAR estimates. 
The GFEV decomposition analysis is then conducted over a simulation horizon of 20 quarters (5 
years) over the period 2000:I-2011:IV.  
3.2. The Role of Country-Specific, Regional and External Factors 
The  ’s and  ’s defined in Section 2 above are tri-dimensional structures (surfaces) whose 
dimensions are given by the simulation horizon, the estimation window and the strength (or 
                                                 
7 These results are not reported to save space. 
8 For each rolling estimate, the VAR models are specified with two lags. Experimenting with shorter and longer lag 
lengths (1 lag and 3 lags, respectively) did not change much the estimation results.  
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direction) of the linkage among the elements of the system.9 Figure 1 shows the decomposition of 
output variability of the LA countries into country-specific, regional and external sources. 
Figure 1 
The results reveal significant differences between countries with respect to the relative 
importance of the variuos factors explaining output growth volatility. Regarding the country-
specific components (graph I in Panels A-F), our model captures the deep crisis hitting Argentina at 
the beginning of the current decade, as shown by the sharp increase in the contribution of the 
country-specific component in explaining output growth variability between the second half of 2011 
and the first semester of 2012. Furthermore, the global downturn led to a sharp drop in the 
contribution of internal factors in the last part of 2008. By contrast, the relative contribution of 
country-specific factors was more stable over time for the remaining LA economies (even in the 
trough the surface plot does not exhibit dramatic changes in its shape), with their importance 
diminishing in the long run. Over the period 2000:I-2011:IV, country-specific shocks tend to 
dominate and account on average for between 75 (in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela) and 60 percent 
(in Mexico) of total variability in the short run. At the end of the simulation horizon, instead, their 
contribution drops markedly, ranging between 40 (in Argentina, Brazil and Chile) and 25 percent 
(in Venezuela).  
Concerning regional factors (graph II in Panels A-F), our results provide evidence of a 
sizeable regional business cycle component in the LA countries, as also found by Aiolfi et al. 
(2010) and Boschi and Girardi (2011), among others. Averaging over all simulation steps and 
rolling estimates, we find that regional factors account from about 20 (in the case of Chile) to 40 
percent (for Venezuela) of output growth variability. For the largest economies of the LA region 
(Argentina and Brazil) the role of regional factors is relatively stable. The same holds in Chile (and 
Peru) until the onset of the global downturn, after which their contribution decreases from 27 (40) 
                                                 
9 In particular, each of them summarises information obtained from combining several hundred (48 times 20 = 960 to be 
precise) elements of matrix (5). 
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to 17 (20) percent after 20 quarters. Finally, a slowly declining pattern is observed in the case of 
Mexico, in contrast to Venezuela, for which a highly erratic evolution over time is found, with the 
Argentine crisis of the early noughties translating into a sizeable increase (from about 30 to 60 
percent after 20 quarters) in the contribution of regional factors.  
Finally, the average effect of external factors (graph III in Panels A-F) is within a similar 
range to the one for the regional components (as also in Aiolfi et al., 2010), its minimum and 
maximum values being those for Venezuela and Peru respectively. As for the individual countries, 
the observed pattern for Argentina mirrors that of the country-specific component: the lowest value 
corresponds to the Argentine crisis, whilst the highest coincides with the first symptoms of the 
global crisis. In all LA countries the role of external factors increases in the most recent years, the 
single exception being Brazil, where business cycles have become less synchronised with those in 
the industrialised economies during the years of the great recession, the evidence suggesting 
therefore some partial decoupling. 
3.3. Evidence from the LA Region 
The variance decomposition for the LA region is computed as an (equally-weighted) average 
of individual country-specific figures. According to equations (9) and (10), it is based on a synthetic 
economy which is an “average” LA country, as in Izquierdo et al. (2008). Figure 2 shows the 
decomposition of regional output variability between region-specific (Panel A) and external sources 
(Panel B).  
Figure 2 
Regarding the regional sources of fluctuations, their relative importance vis-à-vis the 
external ones appears to diminish over the simulation horizon. The dominant role of external factors 
in the long run is found for all quarters. In particular, external factors account for about 30 percent 
of the long-run (20-quarter horizon) variance of LA GDP growth, consistently with the evidence in 
Österholm and Zettelmeyer (2007) and in Aiolfi et al. (2010).  
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As for the evolution over time of the estimated effects, the relative contribution of the two 
types of factors is remarkably stable up to the first half of 2008. With the onset of the global crisis 
external factors appear to acquire an increasing role, especially at the very bottom of the global 
downturn (between mid-2008 and mid-2009), accounting for more than 50 percent of total 
variability in 2008:IV. Subsequently, following a partial recovery, idiosyncratic factors have 
regained some (but not all) of their former importance. Our findings therefore give support to 
previuos evidence according to which the LA region is still characterised by heavy dependence on 
external factors and does not carry sufficient weight to affect the international business cycle with 
its own growth dynamics (Calvo et al., 1993; Izquierdo, 2008; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2011), thus 
contradicting the so-called “decoupling” hypothesis (Helbling et al., 2007). 
Further evidence is presented in Figure 3, which shows the difference between the 
variability transmitted to and received from the external bloc of the system as defined by (11). 
There is a predominance of negative values for the rolling estimates (especially when considering 
long-run effects), suggesting that the LA region can be characterised as a net receiver of variability 
from the outside world. This applies even more strongly to the recovery period after the peak of the 
global crisis: the long-run net effect, after reaching a minimum of -17 percent in 2008:IV, is about -
8 percent at the end of the sample. 
Figure 3 
However, net spillover effects vis-à-vis an aggregate “rest of the world” could hide 
underlying heterogeneity, which can only be detected by a more disaggregate analysis. Figure 4 
presents the net pairwise spillover effects between the LA region and the US (Panel A), the Euro 
area (Panel B), Japan (Panel C) and China (Panel D). 
Figure 4 
Both short- and long-run effects appear to be very stable, especially in the case of China. In 
particular, the balance between volatility transmitted to and received from the outside world is 
negative for the LA region in most cases. This is largely true for the years of the great recession 
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(2007-2009), during which the LA region suffered from the recessionary impulses coming from the 
most advanced economies (but not from China). In the most recent years, however, the overall 
picture seems to have changed significantly, namely the impact of business cycle conditions in the 
US, the Euro area and Japan has diminished, whilst the influence of the Chinese economy has 
increased. Overall, the disaggregate results provide no evidence of de-coupling; they also indicate 
that bilateral linkages with China have become stronger, making the LA region vulnerable not only 
to economic hardship in the industrialised economies but also to future developments in China, as 
already pointed out by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011). 
 
4. Determinants of the Linkages between the LA Region and the World Economy 
4.1. The Role of Trade and Capital Flows 
Since the study of Frankel and Rose (1998) a considerable body of empirical research (Imbs, 2006, 
2010; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2009) has shown that bilateral trade flows ( tra ) and financial linkages 
( fin ) can affect business cycles correlations ( ) across countries and/or regions. Following this 
literature, a canonical regression model can be specified as  
1 2 3tra fin                (13) 
The positive effect of bilateral trade flows on the degree of international business cycle 
synchronisation has been widely established in the literature (see Imbs, 2006 among others) and is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model developed by Kose and Yi (2006). As for 
capital flows, several studies give support to the view that financial integration increases the degree 
of business cycle correlations in cross-sections and over time (Imbs, 2006, 2010), whilst other 
papers (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2009) find that financially integrated economies have negative 
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co-movements, as posited by standard international real business cycle models with complete 
markets (Backus et al., 1994). The sign for 3  in (13) is thus the object of empirical scrutiny.10 
We follow Frankel and Rose (1998) and compute (a time variant version of) bilateral trade 
intensities as  
, , , ,
, ,
l e t e l t
t
l t e t
X X
tra
Y Y
   
where , ,l e tX  denote total merchandise exports from the LA region ( l ) to the external bloc ( e ), , ,e l tX  
are exports from the aggregate foreign economy to the LA region, ,l tY  and ,e tY  are the GDP nominal 
levels in the two economies, and t  is a time index. 
As for capital flows between the two blocs, they are computed as  
, ,
, ,
l t e t
t
l t e t
NFA NFA
fin
Y Y
   
where ,l tNFA  and ,e tNFA  stand for the net foreign asset position in the two aggregate economies. 
The rationale behind such a proxy for capital movements is that capital should flow between 
countries or regions with different or even opposite external positions (Imbs, 2006). In particular, 
we compute the net foreign asset position as the sum of net positions in debt ( dbt ), equities ( eqt ) 
and foreign direct investment ( fdi ) as in Caballero (2012), among others.11 
                                                 
10 In the literature additional explanatory variables for  , such as exchange rate arrangements and the structure of 
production and trade, have been suggested. However, we are interested in explaining how the degree of business cycle 
synchronisation has changed over time rather than across countries, and therefore time-invariant regressors or 
explanatory variables that only change slowly over time are ruled out from the present study. A time series analysis of 
the determinants of business cycle correlations is quite novel, only a limited number of studies on this topic being 
available at present (see, among others, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2009; Imbs, 2010). 
11 Bilateral trade data and statistics for capital flows are from the IMF’s DoTS and IFS BoP databases, respectively. The 
analysis focuses on net capital flows. Since IFS BoP records outflows as negative numbers, to obtain net flows assets 
and liabilities are added. FDI data for China are not available for the entire sample span considered in the analysis, and 
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4.2. Estimation Results 
Using spillover indexes rather than standard correlation coefficients makes it possible to analyse 
(time-varying) business cycle correlations in a much more flexible framework by distinguishing 
between co-movements at different forecast horizons. To see this, we start by mapping our spillover 
index to the (time-varying) correlation coefficients. Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we 
consider the following least square regression between output growth rates of countries a  and b , 
a by a b y u     , so that  
0.52 2
2
b
a
b     
 or 
0.52
2
b
ab
     
         (14) 
The term in square brackets on the RHS of the second expression in (14) is the share of 
output growth variability of country a  explained by b . In terms of our framework, it is expressed 
by ext  in (10). Condition (14) implies that * extb      (for a given forecast horizon). 
Accordingly, equation (13) can be rewritten as follows 
* * * * *
1 2 3h tra fin                (15) 
where *i i b   , 1,...,3i  , b   , provided that 0b  . As ext  is computed over a number of 
different simulation steps, h , condition (15) can be tested at several forecast horizons in order to 
assess whether and how the role of trade and financial linkages varies according to h . In what 
follows we consider selected simulation horizons (namely, 1, 2,4,8,12,20h  ). 
The first step of the empirical analysis is based on standard correlation measures between *  
and its main macroeconomic determinants. Table 1 shows that the unconditional correlation 
coefficients for the * ’s and tra  variables are positive and statistically significant for all forecast 
horizons considered, confirming the well established finding that higher business cycle 
                                                                                                                                                                  
therefore fdi  is computed using data only for the US, the Euro area and Japan. The series have been seasonally 
adjusted using the X-12 method. 
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synchronisation is associated with stronger trade intensity. One might argue that the positive 
correlation is spurious owing to the existence of factors correlated to both variables. When 
conditioning on fin , the magnitude (and the statistical significance) of the partial correlation 
coefficients remains virtually unchanged. By contrast, the unconditional correlation between * ’s 
and fin  turn out to be statistically insignificant. The same conclusion holds when considering the 
partial measure of association (conditioned on tra ), even though the sign of the relationship in 
general becomes negative. 
Table 1 
Correlations are only partially informative as they cannot gauge causality between the 
regressand and the explanatory covariates. In order to delve deeper into the effects of bilateral trade 
and capital flows on business cycle synchronisation, we estimate equation (15) by 2SLS for the 
chosen simulation horizons.12 In order to control for the collapse (and the subsequent abrupt 
recovery) in trade flows which occurred during the 2008-2009 crisis, we augment the set of 
regressors by a crisis dummy ( dum ) taking the value of -1 in 2008:III and  2008:IV and +1 in 
2009:I and 2009:II.13 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the baseline specification.14 Single, double or triple 
asterisks denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. We 
                                                 
12 Typical external instruments for trade intensity are spatial characteristics (e.g. geographic proximity or the presence 
of common borders), and for financial integration institutional variables related to legal arrangements. As most of these 
instruments are constant over time, they cannot be used in a time series framework. In order to address endogeneity 
concerns, bilateral trade intensity and capital flows are measured at the beginning of the period and are treated as pre-
determined variables. 
13 The estimation results in Sections 4.2. and 4.3. are not affected by the inclusion of dum : re-estimating model (15) 
without it produces qualitatively similar results to those reported in the main text.  
14 After considerable experimentation, our preferred specification is based on variables expressed in year-on-year 
changes. For the purpose of readibility variables have been standardised. 
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also report robust standard errors (in parentheses) as well as some basic diagnostics for the chosen 
instruments ( J  statistics), the serial correlation of the residuals ( DW ) and the goodness of fit of 
the regression ( 2adjR ). 
Table 2 
The estimation results indicate a clear dominance of trade flows over financial linkages as 
the main determinant of business cycle co-movements between the LA region and the foreign bloc, 
even controlling for the trade collapse in 2008-2009: the coefficient of bilateral trade intensity is 
positive and statistically significant at all simulation steps; moreover it increases almost 
monotonically with h . Capital flows reduce the degree of co-movement between cycles, but the 
coefficients of fin  are generally small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated.  
Overall, these findings reinforce the disaggregate results discussed in Section 3.3 and show 
that, in the presence of relatively weak financial linkages, propagation of the impulses from outside 
to the LA bloc has happened mainly through trade flows. 
The apparent de-coupling of the LA bloc from the most advanced economies thus arises not 
only from trade being increasingly oriented towards China rather than its historical trading partners 
(namely the US and the Euro area – see Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011), but also from a low degree of 
financial integration with the rest of the world economy. 
4.3. Extensions 
In this Section we present the results from a disaggregate analysis based on a breakdown of capital 
flows into debt, equity and FDI flows with the aim of shedding light on what type of flows are 
behind stronger business cycle co-movements. 
We first assess the role of these components by replacing fin  with disaggregated capital 
flows (entering the model individually). The results in Table 3 indicate that the trade channel, albeit 
dominant, is not the only one: capital flows can also affect the degree of international business cycle 
synchronisation in the short run (namely, up to the fourth simulation step). Moreover, portfolio 
 19
equity flows have a negative effect on the degree of business cycle synchronisation whilst that of 
debt and foreign direct investment is positive. 
Table 3 
As a further step, we consider a specification where the three types of flows enter the model 
simultaneously (Table 4). Over the first year of the simulation horizon its explanatory power is 
higher with respect to its (nested) counterparts in Table 2 and Table 3, suggesting that debt, 
portfolio equity and foreign direct investment act as additional channels of transmission of shocks 
from abroad. 
Our findings complement previous evidence for emerging markets according to which both 
trade and financial variables mattered prior to the global crisis (Blanchard et al., 2010), since we 
document that these factors largely explain business cycle co-movements over the last decade. 
However, our framework makes it possible to go further and to highlight the relative strength of the 
different transmission channels in the short and long run: the increasing explanatory power of trade 
flows over the entire simulation span is largely corroborated, whereas capital flows affect business 
cycle co-movement in the short term, as the 2adjR  statistics show.
15 Moreover, in the very short term 
debt and foreign direct investment have an opposite effect compared to equity portfolio flows. 
While the result for eqt  can be rationalised within the standard international real business cycle 
framework with complete markets, our findings for dbt  and fdi  suggest that short-term capital 
flows and internationalisation of production through foreign direct investment may strengthen the 
role of trade channel making the LA region more prone to suffer from the propagation of shocks 
from abroad. 
Table 4 
                                                 
15 This also implies that the statistically significance of the coefficient on equity portfolio flows after the first four 
quarters of the simulation span makes only a marginal contribution to explaining how the LA bloc and the rest of the 
world co-move. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper presents a flexible framework to assess both short- and long-run linkages between 
business cycles. Specifically, we extend the econometric approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) to 
analyse the extent to which business cycle developments in six LA countries (namely, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) and the four largest economies in the world (the US, the 
Euro area, Japan and China) are connected over the period 1980:I-2011:IV.  
For that purpose, we decompose macroeconomic fluctuations in domestic output growth 
rates into the following components: i) country-specific (idiosyncratic) factors; ii) regional factors, 
capturing fluctuations that are common to all countries belonging to the LA region; iii) external 
factors, which are related to business cycle development outside the LA region. Most importantly, 
we are able to determine the direction and the intensity of the propagation mechanisms and 
therefore establish to what extent the LA economies and LA region as a whole have been dependent 
on (or influenced by) external developments over time. 
Overall, the business cycle of the individual LA countries appears to be influenced by 
country-specific, regional and external shocks in a very heterogenous way. Also, the LA region as a 
whole is strongly dependent on external developments. This conclusion holds especially for the 
years after the great recession of 2008 and 2009, ruling out any decoupling of the LA region from 
the rest of the world. 
More specifically, we find a clear dominance of trade flows over financial linkages as a 
determinant of business cycle co-movements between the the LA region and the foreign bloc. The 
apparent de-coupling of the LA area with respect to the most advanced economies in recent years 
thus seems to have been determined not only by increasing trade flows towards China but also by a 
low degree of financial integration with its main economic partners.  
The decomposition of capital flows into their components (debt, portfolio equity and foreign 
direct investment flows) shows a negative effect of portfolio equity flows on the degree of business 
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cycle synchronisation, consistently with the predictions of standard international real business cycle 
models with complete markets. In contrast, short-term capital and foreign direct investment flows 
tend to reinforce in the short run the role of the trade channel and the responsiveness of the LA 
region to external developments. 
The proposed econometric approach is of more general interest, since it does not include any 
variables which are highly country- or region-specific and thus can also be used to investigate the 
relationship between comovement across countries/regions or financial markets and their 
macroeconomic determinants. For instance, it could be applied to analyse the factors that have 
influenced integration of the real economies in the European Monetary Union after the adoption of 
the euro, or to assess the historical determinants of the regional convergence/divergence dynamics 
within countries over time, or to conduct a macro analysis of market integration in a given financial 
segment. These are all interesting topics for future research.  
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Figure 1 – LA countries: country-specific, regional and external factors (continued) 
Panel A – Argentina 
I. Country-specific component II. Regional component III. External component 
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Panel B – Brazil 
I. Country-specific component II. Regional component III. External component 
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Figure 1 – LA countries: country-specific, regional and external factors (continued) 
Panel C – Chile 
I. Country-specific component II. Regional component III. External component 
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Panel D – Mexico 
I. Country-specific component II. Regional component III. External component 
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Figure 1 – LA countries: country-specific, regional and external factors (completed) 
Panel E – Peru 
I. Country-specific component II. Regional component III. External component 
 
Panel F – Venezuela 
I. Country-specific component II. Regional component III. External component 
 
Note. In each tri-dimensional graph, the horizontal plane is spanned by the temporal horizon and the simulation steps, whilst the vertical axis measures the intensity of the 
indicator. 
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Figure 2 – LA region: region-specific versus external factors 
Panel A – Region-specific component 
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Panel B – External component 
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Note. See Figure 1.  
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Figure 3 – LA region: net effects (region-specific minus external factors) 
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Note. See Figure 1. Positive (negative) values indicate that volatility transmitted to external countries is greater (lower) 
than that received from them. 
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Figure 4 – LA region: net effects (region-specific minus individual foreign country factors) 
Panel A – US Panel B – Euro area 
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Panel C – Japan Panel D – China 
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Table 1 – Correlation analysis: business cycle co-movements vs trade and capital flows 
 Unconditional correlations 
 1h   2h   4h   8h   12h   20h   
*( , )hcorr tra  0.424*** 0.486*** 0.550*** 0.538*** 0.497*** 0.507*** (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
*( , )hcorr fin  0.119 0.140 0.199 0.122 0.096 0.034 (0.447 (0.370) (0.202) (0.435) (0.540) (0.831) 
 Conditional correlations 
 1h   2h   4h   8h   12h   20h   
*( , | )hcorr tra fin  0.410*** 0.470*** 0.524*** 0.530*** 0.493*** 0.521*** (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
*( , | )hcorr fin tra  -0.010 -0.007 0.041 -0.050 -0.065 -0.145 (0.949) (0.963) (0.796) (0.753) (0.682) (0.359) 
 
Note. Triple asterisks denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1 percent level. p -values are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2 – Business cycle co-movements, trade intensity and aggregate capital flows 
 1h   2h   4h   8h   12h   20h   
tra  0.224*** 0.267*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.297*** 0.321*** 
(0.077) (0.084) (0.125) (0.073) (0.103) (0.072) 
fin  -0.028 -0.027 0.017 -0.065 -0.079 -0.152 
(0.095) (0.07) (0.154) (0.149) (0.159) (0.118) 
dum  
1.680*** 1.834*** 1.801*** 1.909*** 1.847*** 1.917*** 
(0.179) (0.126) (0.230) (0.123) (0.162) (0.104) 
J  0.86 0.44 0.96 0.30 0.41 0.36 
DW  2.31 2.35 2.10 1.92 2.29 2.20 
2
adjR  0.35 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.47 0.52 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the measure of business cycle co-movement computed according to condition (15) of 
the main text for selected simulation horizons. See Sections 4.1. and 4.2. for the definition of the explanatory variables. 
Single, double or triple asterisks denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 3 – Business cycle co-movements, trade intensity and sub-components of capital flows 
 Debt flows 
 1h   2h   4h   8h   12h   20h   
tra  0.137** 0.224** 0.286** 0.293*** 0.268*** 0.257*** 
(0.062) (0.104) (0.114) (0.064) (0.097) (0.063) 
dbt  0.257** 0.116 0.152 0.051 0.020 0.061 
(0.098) (0.113) (0.093) (0.074) (0.096) (0.152) 
dum  1.557*** 1.777*** 1.732*** 1.877*** 1.828*** 1.869*** 
(0.146) (0.125) (0.272) (0.142) (0.165) (0.095) 
J  0.90 0.38 0.76 0.35 0.38 0.30 
DW  2.24 2.37 2.18 1.97 2.34 2.32 
2
adjR  0.40 0.47 0.53 0.54 0.47 0.50 
 Equity flows 
 1h   2h   4h  8h  12h   20h 
tra  0.322** 0.344*** 0.427*** 0.386*** 0.317*** 0.324*** 
 (0.139) (0.088) (0.124) (0.089) (0.093) (0.046) 
eqt  -0.262** -0.210** -0.232*** -0.192** -0.108 -0.118 
 (0.118) (0.08) (0.081) (0.082) (0.080) (0.076) 
dum  1.663*** 1.820*** 1.791*** 1.891*** 1.832*** 1.892*** 
 (0.309) (0.135) (0.217) (0.105) (0.178) (0.086) 
J  0.52 0.23 0.51 0.55 0.31 0.30 
DW  2.41 2.40 2.09 2.00 2.34 2.30 
2
adjR  0.42 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.48 0.51 
 Foreign direct investment flows 
 1h   2h   4h  8h  12h   20h 
tra  0.195** 0.237** 0.321** 0.302*** 0.273*** 0.282*** 
 (0.083) (0.099) (0.127) (0.076) (0.077) (0.057) 
fdi  0.154 0.158** 0.081 0.049 0.008 -0.047 
 (0.106) (0.061) (0.106) (0.129) (0.123) (0.148) 
dum  1.657*** 1.811*** 1.792*** 1.895*** 1.836*** 1.904*** 
 (0.201) (0.164) (0.257) (0.118) (0.143) (0.093) 
J  0.99 0.57 0.98 0.31 0.42 0.35 
DW  2.23 2.30 2.12 1.94 2.32 2.26 
2
adjR  0.38 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.47 0.50 
 
Note. See Table 2. 
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Table 4 – Business cycle co-movements, trade intensity and disaggregate capital flows 
 1h   2h   4h  8h  12h   20h 
tra  0.239** 0.301** 0.376*** 0.366*** 0.309** 0.306*** 
(0.102) (0.137) (0.096) (0.098) (0.135) (0.049) 
dbt  
0.248*** 0.095 0.155 0.054 0.026 0.083 
(0.085) (0.116) (0.098) (0.077) (0.107) (0.100) 
eqt  -0.287* -0.227** -0.246** -0.198* -0.110* -0.120** 
(0.156) (0.087) (0.119) (0.114) (0.062) (0.050) 
fdi  0.128 0.155** 0.069 0.051 0.009 -0.055 
(0.107) (0.066) (0.108) (0.108) (0.120) (0.124) 
dum  
1.531*** 1.756*** 1.710*** 1.860*** 1.818*** 1.860*** 
(0.168) (0.144) (0.181) (0.137) (0.146) (0.083) 
J  0.59 0.25 0.36 0.63 0.27 0.23 
DW  2.31 2.40 2.19 2.07 2.36 2.33 
2
adjR  0.46 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.45 0.49 
 
Note. See Table 2. 
 
